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Abstract: With the increasing demand for intelligent services of the Internet of Things (IoT),
its security issues have attracted widespread attention recently. Since most of the existing identity
authentication policies are based on a single authentication mode, they are highly likely to cause
problems such as illegal operation and stealing of sensor information. In order to meet the
needs of increasing IoT users for the security management of intelligent services, a multi-point
collaborative authentication method based on user image intelligent collection for the security
problems faced by IoT in identity authentication is proposed in the paper. This method firstly collects
the identity of the legal user through the intelligent collection technology and then realizes the
identity authentication of the unidentified user through the collaborative authentication between
the local domain management machine, the back-end image management machine, and the cloud
server. Compared with the traditional single identity authentication method, our method uses
three-party collaborative authentication to avoid the problem of sensor information stealing easily
caused by a single authentication method, which makes the user’s identity authentication more
secure and effective. The security analysis shows that the method is able to resist multiple attacks
and prevent the sensor information from being illegally operated and stolen, protecting the security
of the sensor information.
Keywords: Internet of Things; identity authentication; collaborative authentication; security
1. Introduction
With the continuous development of technology, the development of the Internet of Things (IoT)
has shown an exponential growth. Combining sensor technology, Internet technology, and wireless
technology, IoT realizes real-time interaction between the virtual network and the real world. It
senses and collects data in real time through a large number of sensors and transmits data to the
server for data calculation and processing. In addition, the processed information is transmitted
to the user. IoT has unlimited application prospects and is currently widely used in smart homes,
wearable devices, implantable devices, medical devices, connected cars, and transportation systems.
Therefore, the Internet of Everything has become an inevitable trend in technology development and
industrial application. Although IoT has greatly improved the level of intelligence and automation
of society, the information transmitted wirelessly and exposed to the public is highly likely to be
tampered with, stolen, and interfered. Therefore, the security of the IoT system has been greatly
threatened. Incidents caused by IoT security occur frequently in the real world, and their influence
and destructive power are extremely great, so that IoT security has already become a topic of global
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concern. The issue of IoT security is the primary problem solved by the development of IoT. With the
increasing attention paid to IoT data security, a secure and effective identity authentication protocol
has become an important requirement for the rapid development of IoT.
IoT identity authentication is threatened by the following major aspects in terms of security.
(1) Denial of service (DoS) attacks: When the data are transmitted, the data transmission of a large
number of machines may cause network congestion, because IoT has a large number of nodes and
exists in a cluster. The attacker may broadcast invalid information to perform a consumptive attack on
the network bandwidth, so that the request of the legal user cannot be executed. (2) Node attack: There
is a large number of sensing nodes in the IoT application, most of which are deployed in unattended
scenarios. Attackers can easily destroy these nodes and impersonate legitimate nodes. Therefore,
there will be a large number of damaged nodes and malicious nodes in the IoT. (3) Replay attack:
The attacker can deceive the IoT system to obtain an authenticated identity by sending a packet
when the destination host has accepted. (4) Eavesdropping and camouflage attacks: The attacker
steals security information from a common channel and falsifies other users’ information through
known security information. In order to solve these problems and protect the security of identity
authentication, this paper proposes a multi-point collaborative authentication method based on user
image intelligent collection in the IoT. Firstly, the intelligent collection technology is used to realize the
image identity collection of legal users, that is the image information of the legal user is collected by
the camera and stored in the database of the local domain management machine, the back-end image
management machine, and the cloud server. Secondly, the camera is used to collect the unidentified
user image information, which was transmitted to the three databases, as well. Thirdly, the legal user
image information and the unidentified user image information in the three databases are compared
to realize the identity authentication of the unidentified user, respectively. Not covering the field of
imagery, the limitation of our method is that it just compares the image of the legal user with the that
of the unidentified user, so there is no algorithm for the image in our method. The security analysis
shows that the method is able to resist multiple attacks and prevent the sensor information from being
illegally operated and stolen, protecting the security of the sensor information.
2. Related Work
With the rapid development of IoT technology, secure identity authentication has become the
focus of research for IoT security in the recent years.
Smart card technology and cryptosystems are used in most identity authentication methods
currently. Tai et al. [1] analyzed Turkanovic´’s Internet of Things-based authentication and key
agreement method for heterogeneous wireless sensor networks (WSN). Analysis showed that the
method had two fatal flaws, that is user anonymity was not achieved, and the attacker could easily
obtain a session key shared between a normal sensor node and a damaged sensor node that has
been connected. In order to solve these two shortcomings, Tai proposed an improved Internet of
Things-based authentication and key agreement method. Using smart card technology and a user
password system, user and sensor node authentication can be realized with the help of network nodes.
Through security analysis, the method has the advantages of user anonymity, ensuring the correctness
of the session key and lightweight computing operations. In recent years, more and more identity
authentication methods have combined smart card technology with other identification technologies.
Challa et al. [2] proposed a new signature-based authentication key establishment method by using
Burrows–Abadi–Needham logic for the IoT environment, which can resist various known attacks.
The method uses smart card technology, combined with the user’s personal biometric technology Bioi
and the user’s password to achieve mutual authentication between the user and sensor equipment.
The method has the advantages of high security, low computing cost, and efficient communication
cost; in addition, it is suitable for practical applications in the IoT environment. Hu et al. [3] proposed
a security and privacy protection method in the IoT environment, outlined the face recognition and
resolution framework based on fog computing, and summarized security and privacy issues, then
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proposed an authentication and session key agreement method, a data encryption method, and a data
integrity check method in order to solve the confidentiality, integrity, and usability problems in the
face recognition process. Dhillon and Kalra [4] used biometrics technology to communicate with
VoIP based on the session initiation protocol (SIP) and proposed a new authentication method based
on multi-factor ECC. The method uses three users’ personal biometrics to provide strong identity
checks and thus enhanced security, proving that the method is resistant to a variety of potential threats
by conducting rigorous security analysis. Zhang et al. [5] proposed a method for mobile terminal
identity authentication based on two-dimensional code technology in a cloud computing environment.
The method adopts QR encoding technology as the two-dimensional code processing technology and
uses the QR code as the information transmission carrier to realize dynamic authentication of a mobile
terminal. According to the security analysis, the method is simple in structure. The method does not
require the use of third-party equipment and has high security and adaptability.
The elliptic curve encryption (ECC) algorithm has the advantages of a small key and high
computational efficiency. Many researchers use the ECC algorithm to replace the traditional encryption
algorithm in the identity authentication method. AL-Turjman et al. [6] proposed a seamless
secure authentication and key agreement (S-SAKA) method using bilinear pairing and elliptic curve
cryptosystems. The method introduced a mobile receiver strategy to extend user authentication
in cloud-based environments. The results showed that the proposed S-SAKA method satisfied the
security attributes and was flexible for node-capture attacks. In addition, the method also resisted
a large number of well-known potential attacks related to data confidentiality, mutual authentication,
session key agreement, user anonymity, password guessing, and key emulation. Kalra and
Sood [7] proposed a secure ECC-based mutual authentication protocol for secure communication
between embedded devices and cloud servers using Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) cookies.
Through security analysis, the protocol is robust to multiple security attacks and provides basic
security requirements. Mo et al. [8] analyzed a secure and efficient user authentication and key
agreement protocol (AKAP), and proposed a more efficient remote user mutual AKAP scheme using
ECC with a provable security for mobile client–server environments. The proposed scheme not only
provides mutual authentication, but also implements a session key agreement between the client and
the server. An informal security analysis showed that the scheme protects against well-known attacks
and provides anonymity to users.
Multi-factor authentication can enhance the security of the identity authentication process.
More and more researchers have improved the traditional single-factor authentication into multi-factor
authentication in identity authentication methods. Jiang et al. [9] analyzed a three-factor mutual
authentication protocol proposed by Amin for wireless sensor networks, indicating that the protocol
was likely to suffer from smart card loss attacks, and the user identity and password could be
guessed using brute force techniques. They proposed a lightweight and secure user authentication
protocol based on the Rabin cryptosystem. The protocol can resist all possible attacks and provide the
required security functions by mutual authentication among users, gateway nodes, and server nodes.
The protocol was able to defend against all possible attacks and provide the required security functions.
Wazid et al. [10] designed a new secure lightweight three-factor remote user authentication method
for the hierarchical IoT network (HloTN), which is called the user authentication key management
protocol (UAKMP). The three factors used in UAKMP are user smart cards, passwords, and personal
biometrics. The method provides a variety of features, including offline sensing node registration,
freely password, biometric update facility, user anonymity, and perceived node anonymity. Xu
and Wu [11] proposed a new three-factor authentication method for wireless sensor networks with
a multi-gateway architecture. The method achieved mutual authentication of four factors, which were
user, home gateway node, foreign gateway node, and sensor node, respectively. After the formal
verification of a protocol security analysis tool (ProVerif) and based on the results of informal analysis,
the method was able to defend against various attacks and meet security attributes.
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Dynamic identity authentication uses multiple encryption to protect data transmission. More and
more researchers have improved the traditional static identity authentication into dynamic identity
authentication in identity authentication methods. Gong et al. [12] proposed an IoT-aware node
authentication mechanism based on dynamic metrics. Firstly, by introducing the computing functions
such as the trust function, the credibility risk assessment function, the feedback control function,
and the active function of the sensing node, the dynamic credibility measurement of the sensing node
was realized. The dynamic credibility measure of the multi-dimensional sensing node was able to
effectively describe the change of the perceived value of the perceived node. Afterwards, a trusted
attestation based on the node trusted measure was realized by using the revocable group signature
mechanism of a local verifier. Zhang and Xu [13] proposed a secure authentication technology based
on a dynamic Bayesian network combined with a trusted protocol in the IoT. By introducing a secure
authentication mechanism based on the combined public key and trusted measurement in the network,
the security of the information exchange was enhanced. The node credibility and path reliability were
considered in the routing decision, so that a highly secure and reliable path was selected for information
transfer in the IoT. The evaluation results showed that the proposed algorithm had better security
performance than the compared algorithm in terms of the overhead and computational complexity of
the real-time application, and it also had the adaptive ability to respond quickly to denial of service
attacks and effectively suppress the threat of abnormal entities in the IoT. Xie et al. [14] proposed
a new lattice-based dynamic group signature method. This method allows any user to dynamically
join a group while achieving effective undo. In addition, the method can achieve non-framework
security, ensuring that other users in the system cannot forge the signature of any user. It was proven
that the method based on the hardness of the lattice problem in the random prediction model was safe.
As a key part of the development of the Internet of Things, RFID technology has also been
the focus of researchers in the field of identity authentication in the Internet of Things in recent
years. Shen et al. [15] analyzed the RFID authentication methods of Chen et al. and pointed out
that their methods were vulnerable to replay attacks and server spoofing attacks. They proposed
a new RFID authentication method using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Security analysis showed
that the method can meet the security requirements of RFID authentication and does not require
additional performance costs, which is more suitable for practical applications. Fan et al. [16] proposed
an ultra-lightweight RFID authentication scheme called ULRAS in order to reduce the computational
cost. ULRAS uses only bit and XOR operations to prevent DDOS attacks. ULRAS uses subkeys and
sub-indexes throughout the key update process and uses the RR method throughout the protocol to
make the protocol well resistant to various attacks. For each update process, ULRAS only needs to
update a portion of the key K randomly, which makes the update process more random. Compared
to other protocols, ULRAS reduces the cost of computing and communication resources and is more
secure. Aghili et al. [17] evaluated the security of the ultra-lightweight RFID mutual authentication
protocol (ULRMAPC) proposed by Fan and demonstrated that the protocol was vulnerable to denial
of service, reader and tag emulation, and desynchronization attacks. They proposed a new improved
authentication, which can provide sufficient resistance to known active and passive attacks.
In summary, most of the research on IoT authentication in the recent years still uses the smart
card technology identity or the single identity authentication method. The identity authentication
method using the smart card technology stores the user’s private information in the smart card
chip, and the attacker can easily steal the user information in the smart card, while the smart card
is easily lost or damaged. The single identity authentication method does not achieve multi-end
mutual authentication and is vulnerable to server spoofing attacks and spoofing attacks. A multi-point
collaborative authentication method based on user image intelligent collection in the IoT is proposed
in this paper. Compared with the traditional single identity authentication method, our method uses
three-party collaborative authentication, which is able to avoid the problems of sensor information
theft and server spoofing attacks, frequently occurring in the single authentication method. Compared
with the traditional identity authentication method using smart card technology, the method proposed
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in this paper using image intelligent collection technology is more friendly and direct and can avoid
the problem of smart card information loss. Although the method does not use the password system,
the user image is used as the unique identity information. Attacks on user password information, such
as password guessing, are avoided.
The organization of this paper is as follows: The specific method of the multi-point collaborative
authentication method is introduced in the Section 3. The safety and cost of the method are analyzed
in the Section 4. The Section 5 presents conclusions and future work.
3. Multi-Point Collaborative Authentication
This section proposes a multi-point collaborative authentication method based on user image
intelligent collection in the IoT. The method mainly includes four phases: (1) the system establishment
phase of user image intelligent multi-point collaborative authentication; (2) the authentication
phase of the local domain management machine and the back-end image management machine;
(3) the authentication phase of the local domain management machine and the cloud server; (4) the
authentication phase of the back-end image management machine and the cloud server. Through
these four phases, it is possible to realize the security of user image intelligent collection and its service
intelligent control.
In these phases, the information transmission between the local domain management machine,
the back-end image management machine, and the cloud server follows the SSL (secure socket layer)
or TLS (transport later security) protocol. Its architecture diagram is shown in Figure 1. The symbols
and definitions used in this paper are shown in Table 1.
cloud server































back-end image management 
machine
unidentified userunidentified user unidentified user unidentified userunidentified user
legal user
legal user
Figure 1. Architecture diagram of the multi-point collaborative authentication method based on user
image intelligent collection in the IoT.
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Table 1. Symbols and definitions.
Symbol Definition
LDMMj The jth local domain management machine
BIMMj The jth back-end image management machine
BIICj The jth back-end image intelligent collector
CS Cloud server
FIICk The kth front-end image intelligent collector
U Legal user
U∗ Unidentified user
Ui The ith legal user
Ti The ith timestamp value generated by the front-end image intelligent collector
TSi The ith timestamp value generated by the local domain management machine
ID(A) A’s identity information
PKk(A) The kth public key generated by A
E(A)PKk(B) Encrypt A with the k
th public key generated by B
SKk(A) The kth private key generated by A
D(A)SKk(B) Decrypt A with the k
th private key generated by B
S(A)SKk(B) Sign A with the k
th private key generated by B
V(A)PKk(B) Verify A with the k
th public key generated by B
P(Ui) Image of legal user Ui
A |⇒ P(B) A captures B image
(A l B)→ C A transfers B to C
C ← (A l B) C receives A transmitted by B
DB(A) A’s database
A ⇑ DB(B) A build a database containing B information
A||B The parallel operation of A and B
Φ(B) Demand B
(A l Φ(B))→ C A transmits demand B to C
ACK Confirmation message
A . /B A check B
A⊗ B A produces B
A
?
= B Whether A is equal to B
A⊕ B A stores B
3.1. The System Establishment Phase of User Image Intelligent Multi-Point Collaborative Authentication
At this phase, the back-end image intelligent collector intelligently collects the image of the
legal user and transmits it to the back-end image management machine. Then, the back-end image
management machine requests the back-end manager to input the identity information and uses
a secure encryption algorithm to transmit it to the local domain management machine and the cloud
server through the secure channel. Finally, they establish their own image information database in
the back-end image management machine, local domain management machine, and cloud server to
complete the system establishment. The brief process diagram is shown in Figure 2. The algorithm is
shown in Algorithm 1.
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Algorithm 1: The System Establishment Phase of User Image Intelligent Multi-Point
Collaborative Authentication
1. BIICj| ⇒ P(Ui),(BIICj l P(Ui))→ BIMMj.
2. BIMMj ← (BIICj l P(Ui)),BIMMj
∣∣⇒ ID(BIMMj) ,BIMMj |⇒ ID(Ui) .
3. BIMMj ⇑ DB(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)).
4. PK1(BIMMj),SK1(BIMMj),E(P(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK1(BIMMj),
(BIMMj l E(P(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK1(BIMMj))→ LDMMj.
5. LDMMj ← (BIMMj l E(P(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK1(BIMMj)),(LDMMj l
Φ(SK1(BIMMj)))→ BIMMj.
6. BIMMj ← (LDMMj l Φ(SK1(BIMMj))),(BIMMj l SK1(BIMMj))→ LDMMj.
7. LDMMj ← (BIMMj l SK1(BIMMj)), D(E(P(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK1(BIMMj))SK1(BIMMj).
8. LDMMj ⇑ DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)).
9. LDMMj . /((LDMMj ⇑ DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj))) ?= 1), if it is not one, then go to
(8), else (LDMMj l ACK)→ BIMMj.
10. BIMMj ← (LDMMj l ACK),PK2(BIMMj),SK2(BIMMj).
11. E(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK2(BIMMj),(BIMMj l
E(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK2(BIMMj))→ CS.
12. CS← (BIMMj l (E(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK2(BIMMj)),(CS l
Φ(SK2(BIMMj)))→ BIMMj.
13. BIMMj ← (CS l Φ(SK2(BIMMj))),(BIMMj l SK2(BIMMj))→ CS.
14. CS← (BIMMj l SK2(BIMMj)),D(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK2(BIMMj))SK2 (BIMMj).
15. CS ⇑ DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)).
16. CS . /(DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)) ?= 1), if it is not one, then go to (15), else
(CS l ACK)→ BIMMj.
17. BIMMj ← (CS l ACK),BIMMj . /(∃(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)) ?= 1), if it is one, then go to (1),
else go to (18).
18. End.
The specific process execution is described as follows:
Step 1: The back-end image intelligent collector BIICj (j = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) intelligently collects
the image P(Ui) of the legal user Ui (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) according to the requirements of the back-end
manager. The legal user image P(Ui) is transmitted to the corresponding back-end image management
machine BIMMj via the secret network.
Step 2: After receiving the legal user image P(Ui) transmitted by the back-end image intelligent
collector, the back-end image management machine BIMMj requests the back-end manager to input
the identity information ID(BIMMj) of the back-end image management machine BIMMj and the
identity information ID(Ui) of this legal user.
Step 3: After receiving the identity information ID(Ui) of the input legal user, the back-end
image management machine BIMMj constructs a corresponding back-end image management
information database DB(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)). This database contains the
identity information ID(BIMMj) of the back-end image management machine, the legal user name
Ui, the identity information ID(Ui) of the legal user, and the image information P(Ui) of the legal user.
Step 4: After constructing the database DB(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)),
the back-end image management machine BIMMj first generates a public key PK1(BIMMj) and
a corresponding private key SK1(BIMMj) based on the elliptic curve encryption method. On this
basis, the back-end image management machine BIMMj encrypts the image P(Ui) of the legal user
and its own identity information ID(BIMMj) using the public key PK1(BIMMj) based on the elliptic
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curve encryption method. The encrypted file is sent to the local domain management machine via SSL
or TLS.
Step 5: After receiving the encrypted file (P(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK1(BIMMj), the local domain
management machine applies it to the back-end image management machine BIMMj for the private
key SK1(BIMMj).
Step 6: After receiving the private key application of the local domain management machine,
the back-end image management machine BIMMj sends the private key SK1(BIMMj) to the local
domain management machine via SSL or TLS.
Step 7: After receiving the private key SK1(BIMMj) sent by the back-end image management
machine BIMMj, the local domain management machine decrypts the received encrypted file
(P(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK1(BIMMj).
Step 8: After decrypting the encrypted file (P(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK1(BIMMj), the local domain
management machine construct a corresponding local domain management image information
database DB(P(Ui)|BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)). This database contains image information P(Ui) of the
legal user, the back-end image management machine name BIMMj, and the identity information
ID(BIMMj) of the back-end image management machine BIMMj.
Step 9: The local domain management machine determines whether the local domain management
image information database DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)) is constructed. If not, go the Step 8;
otherwise, send confirmation message to the back-end image management machine BIMMj.
Step 10: After receiving the confirmation message sent by the local domain management
machine, the back-end image management machine BIMMj generates a public key PK2(BIMMj) and
a corresponding private key SK2(BIMMj) according to the elliptic curve encryption method.
Step 11: The back-end image management machine BIMMj uses the public key PK2(BIMMj) to
encrypt image P(Ui) of the legal user, the identity information ID(Ui) of the user image, and its own
identity information ID(BIMMj) according to the elliptic curve encryption method, then sends its
encrypted file (P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK2(BIMMj) to the cloud server via SSL or TLS.
Step 12: After receiving the encrypted file (P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK2(BIMMj), the cloud
server applies it to the back-end image management machine BIMMj for the private key SK2(BIMMj).
Step 13: After receiving the private key application of the cloud server, the back-end image
management machine BIMMj sends the private key SK2(BIMMj) to the cloud server via SSL or TLS.
Step 14: After receiving the private key SK2(BIMMj) sent by the back-end image
management machine BIMMj, the cloud server decrypts the received encrypted file
(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK2(BIMMj).
Step 15: After decrypting the encrypted file (P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))PK2(BIMMj),
the cloud server constructs a corresponding cloud server image information database
DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)). This database contains the image information P(Ui) of the legal
user, the identity information ID(Ui) of the legal user, and the identity information ID(BIMMj) of
the back-end image management machine BIMMj.
Step 16: The cloud server determines whether the cloud server image information database
DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)) is constructed. If not, go to Step 15; otherwise, send a confirmation
message to the back-end image management machine BIMMj.
Step 17: After receiving the confirmation message sent by the cloud server, the back-end image
management machine BIMMj determines whether the back-end manager needs the back-end image
intelligent collector BIICj to collect the legal user image, and if necessary, then go to the Step 1;
otherwise, go to Step 18.
Step 18: End of system construction.
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3.2. The Authentication Phase of the Local Domain Management Machine and the Back-End Image
Management Machine
At this phase, the front-end image intelligent collector collects the unidentified user image
information and transmits it to the local domain management machine via the secret network.
The local domain management machine applies for authentication to the back-end image management
machine in the form of a digital signature. Then, the local domain management machine encrypts the
unidentified user image information and transmits it to the back-end image management machine
through the encryption algorithm. Next, query the image information of all legal users in the
local domain management image information database and the back-end image management image
information database and respectively compare the legal user image information in these two databases
with the image information of the unidentified user. Finally, complete mutual authentication between
the local domain management machine and the back-end image management machine. The brief
process diagram is shown in Figure 3. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2.
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Algorithm 2: The Authentication Phase of the Local Domain Management Machine and the
Back-End Image Management Machine
1. FIICk . /(∃(U∗||P(U∗)) ?= 1), if it is one, then go to (3), else go to (2).
2. FIICk wait 3 s, then go to (1).
3. FIICk| ⇒ P(U∗n),FIICk ⊗ Ti,(FIICk l (P(U∗n)||Ti)→ LDMMj.
4. LDMMj ← (FIICk l (P(U∗n)||Ti),LDMMj ⊗ TSi,LDMMj . /(((Ti − TSi) ≥ ∆t) ?= 1), if it is
one, LDMMj delete P(U∗n), then go to (2), else
LDMMj . /(∃P(Ui) ∈ (DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj))), LDMMj . /(P(Ui) ?= P(U∗n)), if
∃P(Ui) ∈ (DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj))) and P(Ui) = P(U∗n), then go to (5), else delete
P(U∗n), and go to (2).
5. message1 = (Apply for authentication), S(message1)SK(LDMMj),
(LDMMj l S(message1)SK(LDMMj))→ BIMMj.
6. BIMMj ← (LDMMj l S(message1)SK(LDMMj)), V(S(message1)SK(LDMMj))PK(LDMMj)
?
= 1,
if it is one, then go to (7), else show “Apply for authentication failure”, and go to (3).
7. message =
(The authentication was successful, please transmit the image of the unidentified user),
(BIMMj l E(message)PK1(BIMMj))→ LDMMj.
8. LDMMj ← (BIMMj l E(message)PK1(BIMMj)),D(E(message)PK1(BIMMj))SK1(BIMMj) .
9. S(P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj),(LDMMj l S(P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj))→ BIMMj.
10. BIMMj ← (LDMMj l S(P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj)),V(S(P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj))PK(LDMMj)
?
= 1, if it is
one, then go to (11), else show “The verification of the image of the unidentified user failed”,
and go to (3).
11. BIMMj ← (FIICk l P(U∗n)).
12. BIMMj . /(∃P(Ui) ∈ DB(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)),
BIMMj . /(P(Ui)
?
= P(U∗n)), if ∃P(Ui) ∈ (DB(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)))
and P(Ui) = P(U∗n), then show “The verification is success between the local domain
management machine and the back-end image management machine”, and go to (13), else
show “The verification failed between the local domain management machine and the
back-end image management machine”, and go to (15).
13. message = (The verification was successful between the local domain management machine
and the back-end image management machine),
(BIMMj l E(message)PK(BIMMj))→ LDMMj.
14. BIMMj . /the transmission of the message is over. If it is over, then go to (15), else go to
(13).
15. End.
The specific process execution is described as follows:
Step 1: The front-end image intelligent collector FIICk intelligently judges whether there is an
unidentified user who needs image collection according to the surrounding scenes. If needed, then go
to Step 3, otherwise, go to Step 2.
Step 2: The front-end image intelligent collector FIICk waits for three seconds and then goes to
Step 1.
Step 3: The front-end image intelligent collector FIICk intelligently collects the image P(U∗n) of
the unidentified user according to the surrounding scene and generates a timestamp value Ti. Then,
the image of the unidentified user and the current timestamp value (P(U∗n)||Ti) are sent to the local
domain management machine through the secret network.
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Step 4: After receiving the image of the unidentified user and the current timestamp value
(P(U∗n)||Ti) sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk, the local domain management
machine generates a timestamp value TSi. Firstly, check if the session delay Ti − TSi is within the
allowable time interval ∆t. If (Ti − TSi) ≥ ∆t, the session times out, and delete the image P(U∗n) of the
unidentified user sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk, then go to Step 2. Then, query
the image information P(Ui) of all legal users in the local domain management image information
database DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)), and compare the legal user image information P(Ui) in
the database DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)) with the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user sent by
the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk. If the image information P(Ui) of a certain legal user
exists in the local domain management image information database DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj))
and the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk is
the same (i.e., P(U∗n) = P(Ui)), go to Step 5; otherwise, delete the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user
sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk, then go to Step 2.
Step 5: According to the back-end image management machine BIMMj corresponding to the
image information P(Ui) of the legal user in the database DB(P(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)), the local
domain management machine first uses the private key SK(LDMMj) and signs the “Apply for
authentication” message, i.e., (“Apply for authentication”)SK(LDMMj). Then, it sends the signed
message to the back-end image management machine BIMMj.
Step 6: After receiving the signature message (“Apply for authentication”))SK(LDMMj) sent by the
local domain management machine, the back-end image management machine BIMMj authenticates
the signature message by using the public key of the local domain management machine. If the
authentication is successful, go to Step 7. Otherwise, display “Apply for authentication failure”, and go
to Step 3.
Step 7: The back-end image management machine BIMMj encrypts the “The authentication
is successful, please transmit the image of the unidentified user” message using the public
key PK1(BIMMj), according to the elliptic curve encryption method, and then sends the
encrypted message (“The authentication is successful, please transmit the image of the unidentified
user”)PK1(BIMMj) to the local domain management machine via SSL or TLS.
Step 8: After receiving the encrypted message (“The authentication is successful, please transmit
the image of the unidentified user”)PK1(BIMMj), the local domain management machine uses private
key SK1(BIMMj) to decrypt.
Step 9: According to the decrypted message, the local domain management machine first uses the
private key SK(LDMMj) to sign the image P(U∗n) message of the unidentified user collected by the
front-end image intelligent collector FIICk, i.e., (P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj). Then, the signed message is sent
to the back-end image management machine BIMMj.
Step 10: After receiving the signature message (P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj) sent by the local domain
management machine, the back-end image management machine BIMMj authenticates the signature
message by using the public key of the local domain management machine. If the authentication is
successful, go to Step 11. Otherwise, display “The verification of the image of the unidentified user
failed”, and go to Step 3.
Step 11: The back-end image management machine BIMMj receives the image P(U∗n) of the
unidentified user sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk.
Step 12: The back-end image management machine BIMMj first queries the image information
P(Ui) of all legal users in its database DB(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)) and compares
the legal user image information P(Ui) in the database DB(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj))
with the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk.
If the image information P(Ui) of a certain legal user exists in the back-end image management
information database DB(Ui||P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||BIMMj||ID(BIMMj)) and the image P(U∗n) of the
unidentified user sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk are the same (i.e., P(U∗n)
= P(Ui)), the back-end image management machine BIMMj displays “The verification is successful
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between the local domain management machine and the back-end image management machine”.
Otherwise, the back-end image management machine BIMMj displays “The verification failed
between the local domain management machine and the back-end image management machine”
and goes to Step 15.
Step 13: The back-end image management machine BIMMj encrypts the image authentication
result message “The verification is successful between the local domain management machine and
the back-end image management machine” and then sends its encrypted message to the local domain
management machine via SSL or TLS.
Step 14: The back-end image management machine BIMMj determines whether the image
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Figure 3. The authentication phase of the local domain management machine and the back-end image
management machine brief process diagram.
3.3. The Authentication Phase of the Local Domain Management Machine and Cloud Server
In this phase, the local domain management machine applies for authentication to the cloud
server in the form of a digital signature. Then, the local domain management machine encrypts
the unidentified user image information and transmits it to the cloud server through the encryption
algorithm. Then, query the image information of all legal users in the cloud server image information
database, and compare the legal user image information in the database with the image information of
the unidentified user. Finally, complete mutual authentication between the local domain management
machine and the cloud server. The brief process diagram is shown in Figure 4. The algorithm is shown
in Algorithm 3.
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Algorithm 3: The Authentication Phase of the Local Domain Management Machine and Cloud
Server
1. LDMMj ← (BIMMj l E(message)PK(BIMMj)), D(E(message)PK(BIMMj))SK(BIMMj).
2. LDMMj . /The verification of the message is successful, if the verification is successful,
then go to (3), else go to (13).
3. message1 = (Apply for authentication), S(message1)SK(LDMMj),
(LDMMj l S(message1)SK(LDMMj))→ CS.
4. CS← (LDMMj l S(message1)SK(LDMMj)), V(S(message1)SK(LDMMj))PK(LDMMj)
?
= 1, if it is
one, then go to (5), else show “Apply for authentication failure” and go to (13).
5. message2 = (The authentication is successful, please transmit the image of the unidentified
user), (CS l E(message2)PK1(BIMMj))→ LDMMj.
6. LDMMj ← (CS l E(message2)PK1(BIMMj)), D(E(message2)PK1(BIMMj))SK1(BIMMj) .
7. S(P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj), (LDMMj l S(P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj))→ CS.
8. CS← (LDMMj l S(P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj)), V(S(P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj))PK(LDMMj)
?
= 1. If it is one,
then go to (9), else show “The authentication of the image of the unidentified user failed”, and
go to (13).
9. CS← (FIICk l P(U∗n)).
10. CS . /(∃P(Ui) ∈ DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)), CS . /(P(Ui) ?= P(U∗n)), if
∃P(Ui) ∈ (DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj))) and P(Ui) = P(U∗n), then the cloud server
shows “The verification is successful between the local domain management machine and the
cloud server”, and go to (11), else the cloud server shows “The verification failed between the
local domain management machine and the cloud server”, and go to (13).
11. message3 = (The verification is successful between the local domain management machine
and the cloud server), (CS l E(message3)PK(BIMMj))→ LDMMj,
(CS l E(message3)PK(BIMMj))→ BIMMj.
12. CS . /the transmission of the message is over. If it is over, then go to (13), else go to (11).
13. End.
The specific process execution is described as follows:
Step 1: The local domain management machine receives the image authentication result message
sent by the back-end image management machine BIMMj and decrypts the message.
Step 2: The local domain management machine determines the decrypted image authentication
result message. If the authentication with the local domain management machine is successful,
the process goes to Step 3. Otherwise, the process goes to Step 13.
Step 3: The local domain management machine first signs the “Apply for authentication” message
using the private key SK(LDMMj), i.e. (“Apply for authentication”))SK(LDMMj), then sends the signed
message (“Apply for authentication”))SK(LDMMj) to the cloud server.
Step 4: After receiving the signature message (“Apply for authentication”))SK(LDMMj) sent by the
local domain management machine, the cloud server authenticates the signature message (“Apply
for authentication”))SK(LDMMj) by using the public key of the local domain management machine. If
the authentication is successful, go to Step 5. Otherwise, display “Apply for authentication failure”,
and go to Step 13.
Step 5: According to the elliptic curve encryption method, the cloud server encrypts the
“The authentication is successful, please transmit the image of the unidentified user” message using
the public key PK1(BIMMj) and then sends the encrypted message (“The authentication is successful,
please transmit the image of the unidentified user”)PK1(BIMMj) to the local domain management
machine via SSL or TLS.
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Step 6: After receiving the encrypted message (“The authentication is successful, please transmit
the image of the unidentified user”)PK1(BIMMj), the local domain management machine uses the private
key SK1(BIMMj) to decrypt the message.
Step 7: According to the decrypted message, the local domain management machine first
uses the private key SK(LDMMj) to sign the collected image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user,
i.e., P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj), then sends the signature message (U
∗
n))SK(LDMMj) to the cloud server.
Step 8: After receiving the signature message P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj) sent by the local domain
management machine, the cloud server authenticates the signature message P(U∗n))SK(LDMMj) by
using the public key of the local domain management machine. If the authentication is successful,
go the Step 9. Otherwise, display “The authentication of the image of the unidentified user failed” and
go to Step 13.
Step 9: The cloud server receives the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user sent by the front-end
image intelligent collector FIICk.
Step 10: The cloud server first queries the image information P(Ui) of all legal users in its
database DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)) and compares the legal user image information P(Ui) in
the database DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)) with the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user sent
by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk. If the image information P(Ui) of a certain legal
user exists in the cloud server database DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)) and the image P(U∗n) of the
unidentified user sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk are the same (i.e., P(U∗n) =
P(Ui)), the cloud server displays “The verification is successful between the local domain management
machine and the cloud server”. Otherwise, the cloud server displays “The verification failed between
the local domain management machine and the cloud server” and goes to Step 13.
Step 11: The cloud server encrypts the image authentication result message “The verification is
successful between the local domain management machine and the cloud server” and then sends the
encrypted message to the local domain management machine and the corresponding back-end image
management machine BIMMj via SSL or TLS.
Step 12: The cloud server determines whether the image authentication result message is sent.
If sent, go to Step 13; otherwise, go to Step 11.
Step 13: End.
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Figure 4. The authentication phase of the local domain management machine and cloud server brief
process diagram.
3.4. The Authentication Phase of the Back-End Image Management Machine and Cloud Server
In this phase, the back-end image management machine applies for authentication to the cloud
server in the form of a digital signature. Secondly, the back-end image management machine encrypts
the information such as the unidentified user image information and transmits it to the cloud server
through the encryption algorithm. Then, query the image information of all legal users in the cloud
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server image information database. Next, compare the image information and the identity information
with the image of the unidentified user, which has been authenticated by the signature and the identity
information of the unidentified user. Finally, complete mutual authentication between the back-end
image management machine and the cloud server. The brief process diagram is shown in Figure 5.
The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: The Authentication Phase of the Back-End Image Management Machine and
Cloud Server
1. BIMMj ← (CS l E(message3)PK(BIMMj)), D(E(message3)PK(BIMMj))SK(BIMMj).
2. BIMMj . /The verification of the message is success . If the verification is success, then go
to (3), else go to (14).
3. message1 = (Apply for authentication), S(message1)SK(BIMMj),
(BIMMj l S(message1)SK(BIMMj))→ CS.
4. CS← (BIMMj l S(message1)SK(BIMMj)), V(S(message1)SK(BIMMj))PK(BIMMj)
?
= 1, if it is
one, then go to (5), else show “Apply for authentication failure”, and go to (13).
5. message2 = (The authentication is successful, please transmit the image of the unidentified
user), (CS l E(message2)PK1(BIMMj))→ BIMMj.


























= 1. If it is one, then go to (9), else
show “The authentication of the image of the unidentified user failed between the cloud
server and the back-end image management machine”, and go to (13).
9. CS⊕ (P(U∗n)||ID(U∗n)||ID(BIMMj)).
10. CS . /(∃P(Ui) ∈ DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)),
CS . /(P(Ui)
?
= P(U∗n) ∧ ID(Ui) ?= ID(U∗n)), if ∃P(Ui) ∈ (DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)))
and P(Ui) = P(U∗n) ∧ ID(Ui) = ID(U∗n), then the cloud server shows “The verification is
successful between the back-end image management machine and the cloud server”, and go
to (11), else the cloud server shows “The verification failed between the back-end image
management machine and the cloud server”, and go to (13).
11. message3 = (The verification is successful between the back-end image management
machine and the cloud server),
(CS l E(message3)PK(BIMMj))→ LDMMj,(CS l E(message3)PK(BIMMj))→ BIMMj.
12. CS . /the transmission of the message is over. If it is over, then go to (13), else go to (11).
13. End.
The specific process execution is described as follows:
Step 1: The back-end image management machine BIMMj receives the image authentication
result message sent by the cloud server and decrypts the message.
Step 2: The back-end image management machine BIMMj determines the decrypted image
authentication result message, and if it is “The verification is successful between the local domain
management machine and the cloud server”, go to Step 3; otherwise, go to Step 14.
Step 3: The back-end image management machine BIMMj first signs the “Apply
for authentication” message using the private key SK(BIMMj), i.e., (“Apply for
authentication”)SK(BIMMj), then sends the signed message (“Apply for authentication”)SK(BIMMj) to
the cloud server.
Electronics 2019, 8, 978 16 of 21
Step 4: After receiving the signature message (“Apply for authentication”)SK(BIMMj) sent by the
back-end image management machine BIMMj, the cloud server authenticates the signature message
(“Apply for authentication”)SK(BIMMj) by using the public key of the back-end image management
machine BIMMj. If the authentication is successful, go to Step 5. Otherwise, display “Apply for
authentication failure”, and go to Step 13.
Step 5: The cloud server encrypts the “The authentication is successful, please transmit the image
of the unidentified user” message according to the elliptic curve encryption method using the public
key PK1(BIMMj) and then sends the encrypted message (“The authentication is successful, please
transmit the image of the unidentified user”)PK1(BIMMj) to the back-end image management machine
BIMMj via SSL or TLS.
Step 6: After receiving the encrypted message, the back-end image management machine BIMMj
decrypts the message by the private key SK1(BIMMj).
Step 7: According to the decrypted message, the back-end image management machine
BIMMj first uses the private key SK(BIMMj) to sign the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user
sent by the local domain management machine. Then, sign its corresponding user identity
information, which is initially compared successfully by the local domain management machine
and the back-end image management machine BIMMj. Finally, sign its own identity information
ID(BIMMj), i.e., ((P(U∗n)||(ID(U∗n)||ID(BIMMj))SK(BIMMj), then send the signature message
((P(U∗n)||(ID(U∗n)||ID(BIMMj))SK(BIMMj) to the cloud server.
Step 8: After receiving the signature message ((P(U∗n)||(ID(U∗n)||ID(BIMMj))SK(BIMMj) sent
by the back-end image management machine BIMMj, the cloud server authenticates the signature
message by using the public key of the back-end image management machine BIMMj. If the signature
authentication is successful, go to Step 9, otherwise, display “The authentication of the image of the
unidentified user failed between the cloud server and the back-end image management machine”, and
go to Step 13.
Step 9: The cloud server stores the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user, which has been
authenticated by the signature, its corresponding user identity information ID(U∗n), and identity
information ID(BIMMj) of the back-end image management machine BIMMj.
Step 10: The cloud server first queries the image information P(Ui) of all legal users,
the identity information ID(Ui) of the legal user, and the identity information ID(BIMMj)
of the back-end image management machine BIMMj in the cloud server image information
database DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj). Then, it respectively compares the image P(U∗n) of the
unidentified user, which has been authenticated by the signature and the identity information
ID(U∗n) of the unidentified user image with the image information P(Ui) of all legal users
and the identity information ID(Ui) of the legal user in the cloud server image information
database DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj). If there is image information P(Ui) of a legal user
and identity information ID(Ui) of a legal user in the cloud server image information database
DB(P(Ui)||ID(Ui)||ID(BIMMj)), this image information P(Ui) and identity information ID(Ui) are
respectively the same as the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user, which has been authenticated
by the signature and the identity information ID(U∗n) of the unidentified user image, i.e., (P(U∗n) =
P(Ui), ID(U∗n) = ID(Ui)), and the cloud server displays “The verification is successful between the
back-end image management machine and the cloud server”. Otherwise, the cloud server displays
“The verification failed between the back-end image management machine and the cloud server”,
and it goes to Step 13.
Step 11: The cloud server encrypts the image authentication result message “The verification is
successful between the back-end image management machine and the cloud server” and then sends
the encrypted message to the local domain management machine and the corresponding back-end
image management machine BIMMj via SSL or TLS.
Step 12: The cloud server determines whether the image authentication result message is sent.
If sent, go to Step 13; otherwise, go to Step 11.
Electronics 2019, 8, 978 17 of 21
Step 13: End.
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Figure 5. The authentication phase of the back-end image management machine and cloud server brief
process diagram.
4. Security and Cost Analysis
In this section, firstly, we analyze the security of the multi-point collaborative authentication
method based on user image intelligent collection and compare our method with Tai’s method [5] and
Kalra’s method [15]. Secondly, we analyze the cost of our method, and the specific description is as
follows. The analysis of safety functions is shown in Table 2.
4.1. Security Analysis
Table 2. Analysis of safety functions.
Security Function Our Method Tai’s Method Kalra’s Method
Resist replay attack
√ √ √
Resist denial of service (DOS) attack
√ √ √












4.1.1. Resist Replay Attack and Denial of Service Attack
In this method, in the authentication phase of the local domain management machine and the
back-end image management machine, the front-end image collector FIICk uses the timestamp value Ti
when collecting the image information of the unidentified user, and after the local domain management
machine receives the image of the unidentified user sent by the front-end image intelligent collector
FIICk and the current timestamp value (P(U∗n)||Ti), another timestamp value TSi is generated.
The local domain management machine first checks the freshness of the time stamp value, that is
whether Ti − TSi is within the allowable time interval ∆t. If (Ti − TSi) ≥ ∆t, the session times out,
and the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user sent by the front-end image intelligent collector FIICk is
deleted. Assuming that the attacker replays the image information P(U∗n) and the timestamp value
Ti that have been verified by the local domain management machine, the local domain management
machine can judge the freshness of the generated different timestamp values TSi, ignoring the
duplicated information, against these replay attacks. It can also reduce the consumption of network
bandwidth and resist denial of service attacks.
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4.1.2. Resist Server Camouflage Attack and Counterfeit Attack
In this method, a malicious attacker cannot masquerade as the local domain management machine
to send the image P(U∗n) of the unidentified user to the back-end image management machine for
authentication and cannot send fake P(U∗n) information to defraud authentication. Before sending
the P(U∗n) to the back-end image management machine, the local domain management machine
first signs the “Apply for authentication” with the private key SK(LDMMj) and sends it to the
back-end image management machine. The back-end image management machine uses the public
key PK(LDMMj) to decrypt the information. Then, it determines whether the application is sent by
the local domain management machine. It can prevent the attacker from disguising the local domain
management machine to destroy the authentication and resist the server camouflage attack. After the
message is successfully authenticated, the back-end image management machine uses the ellipse
encryption algorithm to encrypt the “The authentication is successful, please transmit the image of
unidentified user” message and sends it to the local domain management machine. Finally, the local
domain management machine uses the private key SK(LDMMj) to sign the P(U∗n) and sends it to
the back-end image management machine. The back-end image management machine determines
whether the P(U∗n) is sent by the local domain management machine by decrypting the information
with the public key PK(LDMMj). It can prevent the attacker from impersonating P(U∗n) information
to destroy the authentication and resist the counterfeit attack. Similarly, the authentication phase of the
local domain management machine and the cloud server and the authentication phase of the back-end
image management machine and the cloud server need to be authenticated in this form. It can also
resist server camouflage attack and counterfeit attack. In Tai’s method, the sensor node is exposed in
public. If a malicious attacker destroys any node, then he/she can pretend that the user is logged into
the normal legal sensor node and launch a counterfeit attack on other sensor nodes.
4.1.3. Resist Eavesdropping Attack and Password Guessing
This method does not use passwords for identity authentication. The only identity information is
legal user image information P(Ui). During the system establishment phase, the malicious attacker
cannot steal the legal user image information P(Ui) sent by the back-end image management machine
BIMMj to the local domain management machine and the cloud server from the common channel.
Because the legal user image information P(Ui) is encrypted by the ellipse encryption algorithm in
the common channel, the attacker cannot calculate the P(Ui) information in polynomial time. In
Tai’s method, the user’s password is stored in the smart card. Once the smart card is stolen by an
authorized malicious attacker, he/she can guess and calculate the actual password of the smart card
owner. In Kalra’s method, a malicious attacker first guesses the password and calculates it to verify that
the password is the correct one. If not, repeat the guess. The attacker can guess the correct password in
a brute force way.
4.1.4. Resist Smart Card Attacks
In this method, image intelligent collection technology is used for identity authentication.
Compared with the traditional smart card authentication method, the image intelligent collection
method is less expensive and has better security and portability. There is no risk of lost, stolen, or
duplicated smart cards, and there is no need to defend against attackers’ attacks on smart card data. In
Tai’s method, user information is stored in a smart card. Once a smart card is stolen or lost, a malicious
attacker can extract all the private information stored in the smart card.
4.1.5. Multi-Point Collaborative Authentication
This method uses a method of mutual authentication between the local domain management
machine and the back-end image management machine, the local domain management machine and
the cloud server, and the back-end image management machine and the cloud server. First, in the
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authentication phase of the local domain management machine and the back-end image management
machine, the local domain management machine needs to compare the unidentified user image P(U∗n)
sent by the front-end image collector with the legal user image P(Ui) in the database constructed in the
system establishment phase. If the same (i.e., P(U∗n)=P(Ui)), the local domain management machine
encrypts the unidentified user image P(U∗n) and transmits it to the back-end image management
machine. Finally, compare it with the legal user image P(Ui) in the database built internally to
complete the phase authentication. The principle of the authentication phase of the local management
machine and the cloud server and the principle of the authentication phase of the back-end image
management machine and the cloud server are similar. If a privileged attacker steals or modifies
the database information in some way and destroys the authentication at a certain phase, it cannot
pass the collaborative identity authentication. In Tai’s method, the sensor nodes, gateway nodes,
and users provided by the company cannot authenticate each other. In Kalra’s method, the embedded
devices and cloud servers provided by them cannot mutually confirm the legitimacy of each other.
Therefore, their methods are more vulnerable to spoofing attacks.
4.2. Cost Analysis
The method uses the symmetric encryption algorithm and the asymmetric encryption algorithm.
The characteristics of the symmetric encryption algorithm and the asymmetric encryption algorithm
show that the symmetric encryption algorithm uses the same key for encryption and decryption,
and the operation is fast, but easy to crack. The asymmetric encryption algorithm uses public key
encryption and private key decryption, which is slow, but not easy to crack. The calculation of the
operation of an asymmetric encryption algorithm (A) is equivalent to a point operation and is also
equal to 1000 symmetric encryption algorithm operations (S). Therefore, assuming that the calculation
cost of the asymmetric encryption algorithm operation (A) is one, the calculation cost of the symmetric
encryption algorithm operation (S) is 0.001. The results of the cost analysis at different phases are
shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Method costs. S, symmetric; A, asymmetric.
N Legal Identity Users in the System and the
Operating Cost of CollectingM Unidentified Users
System establishment phase 4S × N = 0.004N
The authentication phase of local domain
management machine and back-end image
management machine
(6S + 1A) ×M = 1.006M
The authentication phase of local domain
management machine and cloud server (6S + 2A) ×M = 2.006M
The authentication phase of the back-end image
management machine and cloud server. (6S + 2A) ×M = 2.006M
Complete method (18S + 5A) ×M + 4S × N = 5.018M + 0.004N
5. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper proposed a multi-point collaborative authentication method based on user image
intelligent collection in IoT. The method mainly consisted of four phases, namely the system
establishment phase of user image intelligent multi-point collaborative authentication,
the authentication phase of the local domain management machine and back-end image management
machine, the authentication phase of local domain management machine and cloud server, and the
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authentication phase of the back-end image management machine and cloud server. To demonstrate
the validity of the method for identity authentication, a series of security analyses was conducted.
Compared with the traditional single identity authentication method, our method used three-party
collaborative authentication to avoid the problem of sensor information stealing easily caused by
a single authentication method, which makes the user’s identity authentication more secure and
effective. The analysis results showed that the method was able to resist multiple types of attacks to
meet the security requirements, attacks such as replay attacks, denial of service attacks, and server
camouflage attacks. In addition, the results also indicated that the method was suitable for identity
authentication in the IoT environment.
This paper did not cover the field of image acquisition and authentication, but only compared the
user’s image information. Therefore, it is not yet possible to estimate the impact of image acquisition
and authentication on the cost, efficiency, and security of the method. In addition, image acquisition
and authentication are also affected by many factors, such as ambient lighting, which result in
a reduction in the recognition rate and performance. Therefore, the future work is to optimize
the algorithms for image acquisition and authentication and consider adding biometrics such as
fingerprint recognition to protect the identity authentication and improve the accuracy of identity
authentication.
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